PAC-Bayes with Minimax for Confidence-Rated Transduction by Balsubramani, Akshay & Freund, Yoav
PAC-Bayes with Minimax for Confidence-Rated Transduction
Akshay Balsubramani
abalsubr@cs.ucsd.edu
University of California, San Diego
Yoav Freund
yfreund@cs.ucsd.edu
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
We consider using an ensemble of binary classifiers for transductive prediction, when unlabeled test
data are known in advance. We derive minimax optimal rules for confidence-rated prediction in this
setting. By using PAC-Bayes analysis on these rules, we obtain data-dependent performance guarantees
without distributional assumptions on the data. Our analysis techniques are readily extended to a setting
in which the predictor is allowed to abstain.
1 Introduction
Modern applications of binary classification have recently driven renewed theoretical interest in the problem
of confidence-rated prediction [1, 2, 3]. This concerns classifiers which, for any unlabeled data example, out-
put an encoding of the classifier’s confidence in its own label prediction. Confidence values can subsequently
be useful for active learning or further post-processing.
Approaches which poll the predictions of many classifiers in an ensemble H are of particular interest for
this problem [4, 5]. The Gibbs (averaged) classifier chooses a random rule from the ensemble and predicts
with that rule. Equivalently, one can say that the prediction on a particular unlabeled example is randomly
+1 or −1 with probabilities proportional to the number of votes garnered by the corresponding labels. This
is intuitively appealing, but it ignores an important piece of information - the average error of the Gibbs
predictor, which we denote by λ. If the ratio between the +1 and −1 votes is more extreme than λ, then
the intuition is that the algorithm should be fairly confident in the majority prediction. The main result of
this paper is a proof that a slight variation of this rough argument holds true, suggesting ways to aggregate
the classifiers in H when the Gibbs predictor is not optimal.
We consider a simple transductive prediction model in which the label predictor and nature are seen as
opponents playing a zero-sum game. In this game, the predictor chooses a prediction gi ∈ [−1, 1] on the ith
unlabeled example, and nature chooses a label zi ∈ [−1, 1]. 1 The goal of the predictor is to maximize the
average correlation Ei [gizi] = 1n
∑n
i=1 gizi over n unlabeled examples, while nature plays to minimize this
correlation.
Without additional constraints, nature could use the trivial strategy of always choosing zi = 0, in which
case the correlation would be zero regardless of the choices made by the predictor. Therefore, we make one
assumption - that the predictor has access to an ensemble of classifiers which on average have small error.
Clearly, under this condition nature cannot use the trivial strategy. The central question is then: What is
the optimal way for the predictor to combine the predictions of the ensemble? That question motivates the
main contributions of this paper:
• Identifying the minimax optimal strategies for the predictor and for nature, and the resulting minimax
value of the game.
1 This can be thought of as parametrizing a stochastic binary label; for instance, zi = −0.5 would be equivalent to choosing
the labels (−1, 1) with respective probabilities (0.75, 0.25).
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• Applying the minimax analysis to the PAC-Bayesian framework to derive PAC-style guarantees. We show
that the minimax predictor cannot do worse than the average ensemble prediction, and quantify situations
in which it enjoys better performance guarantees.
• Extending the analysis to the case in which the predictor can abstain from committing to any label and
instead suffer a fixed loss. A straightforward modification of the earlier minimax analysis expands on prior
work in this setting.
2 Preliminaries
The scenario we have outlined can be formalized with the following definitions.
1. Classifier ensemble: A finite set of classification rules H = {h1, . . . , hH} that map examples x ∈ X
to labels y ∈ Y := {−1, 1}. This is given to the predictor, with a distribution q over H.
2. Test set: n unlabeled examples xi ∈ X , denoted T = {x1, . . . , xn}. 2
3. Nature: Nature chooses a vector z ∈ [−1, 1]n encoding the label associated with each test example.
This information is unknown to the predictor.
4. Low average error: Recall the distribution q over the ensemble given to the predictor. We assume
that for some λ > 0,
1
n
n∑
i=1
H∑
j=1
qjhj(xi)zi = λ. So the average correlation between the prediction of
a randomly chosen classifier from the ensemble and the true label of a random example from T is at
least λ. 3
5. Notation: For convenience, we denote by F the matrix that contains the predictions of (h1, . . . , hH)
on the examples (x1, . . . , xn). F is independent of the true labels, and is fully known to the predictor.
F =

h1(x1) h2(x1) · · · hH(x1)
h1(x2) h2(x2) · · · hH(x2)
...
...
. . .
...
h1(xn) h2(xn) · · · hH(xn)
 (1)
In this notation the bound on the average error is expressed as: 1nz
>Fq ≥ λ.
3 The Confidence-Rated Prediction Game
In this game, the goal of the predictor is to find a function g : T 7→ [−1, 1]n (a vector in Rn), so that each
example xi maps to a confidence-rated label prediction gi ∈ [−1, 1]. The predictor maximizes the worst-case
correlation with the true labels z>g, predicting with the solution g∗ to the following game:
Find: max
g
min
z
1
n
z>g (2)
Such that: 1nz
>a ≥ λ and − 1n ≤ z ≤ 1n,
−1n ≤ g ≤ 1n
2We could also more generally assume we are given a distribution r over T which unequally weights the points in T . The
arguments used in the analysis remain unchanged in that case.
3Equivalent to the average classification error being ≤ 1
2
(1− λ).
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where a := Fq ∈ Rn represents the ensemble predictions on the dataset:
a =
(
H∑
j=1
qjhj(x1) ,
H∑
j=1
qjhj(x2), . . . ,
H∑
j=1
qjhj(xn)
)>
It is immediate from the formulation (2) that the predictor can simply play g = a, which will guarantee
correlation λ due to the average performance constraint. This is the prediction made by the Gibbs classifier
hq(x) = Eh∼q [h(x)], which averages across the ensemble. We now identify the optimal strategy for the
predictor and show when and by how much it outperforms hq.
4
3.1 Analytical Solution
Consider the game as defined in (2). The conditions for minimax duality hold here (Prop. 9 in the appendices
for completeness), so the minimax dual game is
min
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
max
g∈[−1,1]n
1
n
z>g (3)
Without loss of generality, we can reorder the examples so that the following condition holds on the
vector of ensemble predictions a.
Ordering 1. Order the examples so that |a1| ≥ |a2| ≥ · · · ≥ |an|. 
Our first result expresses the minimax value of this game. (All proofs are deferred to the appendices.)
Lemma 1. Using Ordering 1 of the examples, let v = min
{
i ∈ [n] : 1n
∑i
j=1 |aj | ≥ λ
}
. Then the value of
the game (2) is V :=
v − 1
n
+
1
|av|
(
λ− 1
n
v−1∑
i=1
|ai|
)
.
This allows us to verify the minimax optimal strategies.
Theorem 2. Suppose the examples are in Ordering 1, and let v be as defined in Lemma 1. The minimax
optimal strategies for the predictor (g∗) and nature (z∗) in the game (2) are:
g∗i =
{
sgn(ai) i ≤ v
ai
|av| i > v
z∗i =

sgn(ai) i < v
1
ai
(
nλ−∑v−1i=1 |ai|) i = v
0 i > v
3.2 Discussion
As shown in Fig. ??, the optimal strategy g∗ depends on the Gibbs classifier’s prediction a in an elegant
way. For the V fraction of the points on which the ensemble is most certain (indices i < v), the minimax
optimal prediction is the deterministic majority vote.
For any example i, g∗i is a nondecreasing function of ai, which is often an assumption on g in similar
contexts [6]. In our case, this monotonic behavior of g∗ arises entirely from nature’s average error constraint;
g itself is only constrained to be in a hypercube.
4 If every h ∈ H makes identical predictions on the dataset and has correlation λ with the true labels, then the ensemble
effectively has just one element, so outperforming it is impossible without outside information.
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When λ ≈ 0 (v ≈ 1), g∗ approximates the ensemble prediction. But as the ensemble’s average correlation
λ increases, the predictor is able to act with certainty (|g∗i | = 1) on a growing number of examples, even
when the vote is uncertain (|ai| < 1).
The value of the game can be written as
V =
v − 1
n
+
1
|av|
(
λ− 1
n
v−1∑
i=1
|ai|
)
≥ v − 1
n
+ λ− 1
n
v−1∑
i=1
|ai| = λ+ 1
n
v−1∑
i=1
(1− |ai|) (4)
This shows that predicting with g∗ cannot hurt performance relative to the average ensemble prediction,
and indeed will help when there are disagreements in the ensemble on high-margin examples. The difference
V − λ = 1n
∑v−1
i=1 (1− |ai|) quantifies the benefit of our prediction rule’s voting rule as opposed to the Gibbs
classifier’s averaged prediction.
Our minimax analysis is able to capture this uniquely vote-based behavior because of the transductive
setting. The relationships between the classifiers in the ensemble determine the performance of the vote,
and analyzing such relationships is much easier in the transductive setting. There is a dearth of applications
of this insight in existing literature on confidence-rated prediction, with [7] being a notable exception.
In this work, the predictor obtains a crude knowledge of the hypothesis predictions F through ensemble
predictions a, and is thereby able to quantify the benefit of a vote-based predictor in terms of a. However,
the loss of information in compressing F into a is unnecessary, as F is fully known to the predictor in a
transductive setting. It would therefore be interesting (and provide a tighter analysis) to further incorporate
the structure of F into the prediction game in future work.
4 A PAC-Bayes Analysis of a Transductive Prediction Rule
The minimax predictor we have described relies on a known average correlation λ > 0 between the ensemble
predictions and true labels. In this section, we consider a simple transductive statistical learning scenario
in which the ensemble distribution q is learned from a training set using a PAC-Bayesian criterion, giving a
statistical learning algorithm with a PAC-style analysis.
Suppose we are in a transductive setting with a training set S with known labels, and a test set T with
unknown labels. S and T are assumed to be composed of labeled examples drawn i.i.d. from a distribution
D over X × Y. We write |S| = m and consider |T | > m.
Denote the true error of a hypothesis h ∈ H by err (h) = PrD (h(x) 6= y), its empirical error on S by
êrrS (h) =
1
m
∑
(x,y)∈S 1(h(x) 6= y), and its empirical error on T by êrrT (h). Also, for any p, q ∈ [0, 1]
define KL (p || q) = p log pq + (1 − p) log 1−p1−q , and otherwise define the KL divergence KL (p || q) between
two distributions p,q ∈ Rn in the usual way as ∑ni=1 pi log piqi .
Figure 1: Optimal strategies g∗, z∗ for
the game without abstention (Thm.
2), plotted against ai.
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Figure 2: Near-optimal abstain prob-
abilities pa,alg (Thm. 6), plotted
against ai.
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Figure 3: An illustration of the minimax optimal predictor g∗, with the linear separators being low-error
hypotheses in H, and the examples colored according to their true labels. The red and blue shaded
areas indicate where the predictor is certain.
Finally, define (m,q,q0, δ) :=
√
2
m
(
KL(q || q0) + log
(
2(m+1)
δ
))
and the error-minimizing hypothesis
h∗ = arg minh∈H err (h).
4.1 An Algorithm with a PAC-Bayes Analysis
Algorithm: The learning algorithm we consider simply observes the labeled set S and chooses a distribution
q over H that has low error on S. Based on this, it calculates a lower bound λˆ (Eq. (6)) on the correlation
with T of the associated Gibbs classifier. Finally, it uses λˆ in the average error constraint for the game of
Section 3, and predicts with the corresponding minimax optimal strategy g∗ as given in Theorem 2.
Analysis: We begin analyzing this algorithm by applying the PAC-Bayes theorem ([8]) to control
Eh∼q [êrrS (h)], which immediately yields the following.
Lemma 3. Choose any prior distribution q0 over H. With probability ≥ 1 − δ over the choice of training
set S, for all distributions q over H simultaneously,
KL (Eh∼q [êrrS (h)] || Eh∼q [err (h)]) (5)
≤ 1
m
(
KL(q || q0) + log
(
m+ 1
δ
))
This can be easily converted into a bound on êrrT (h), using a Hoeffding bound and the well-known
inequality KL (p || q) ≥ 2(p− q)2:
Theorem 4. Choose any prior distribution q0 over the hypotheses H. With probability ≥ 1 − δ, for all
distributions q over H simultaneously,
Eh∼q [êrrT (h)] ≤ Eh∼q [êrrS (h)] + (m,q,q0, δ)
Theorem 4 w.h.p. controls the average classifier performance on the test set. Recall that this constrains
nature in the minimax analysis, where it is expressed as a lower bound λˆ on the average correlation 1 −
2Eq [êrrT (h)]. From Theorem 4, with probability ≥ 1− δ, for all q,
λˆ = 1− 2Eq [êrrS (h)]− 2(m,q,q0, δ) (6)
Inside this high-probability event, the scenario of Section 3 (the prediction game) holds, with λ given by
(6). A higher correlation bound λˆ leads to better performance.
In the game of Section 3, values in [−1, 1] can be thought of as parametrizing stochastic binary la-
bels/predictions (see Footnote 1). By this token, if the value of the game is V , the prediction algorithm is
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incorrect with probability at most 12 (1− V ) ≤ 12
(
1− λˆ− 1n
∑v−1
i=1 (1− |ai|)
)
(from (4)). Combining this
with (6) and a union bound, the algorithm’s probability of error is at most
Eq [êrrS (h)]− 1
2n
v−1∑
i=1
(1− |ai|) + (m,q,q0, δ) + δ (7)
Since (6) holds uniformly over q, the training set S can be used to set q to minimize Eq [êrrS (h)]. However,
naively choosing a point distribution on arg minh êrrS (h) (performing empirical risk minimization) is inad-
visable, because it does not hedge against the sample randomness. In technical terms, a point distribution
leads to a high KL divergence term (using a uniform prior q0) in (6), and of course eliminates any potential
benefit from voting with respect to the Gibbs classifier. Instead, a higher-entropy distribution is apropos,
like the exponential-weights distribution qexp(h) ∝ exp (−ηêrrS (h)).
Regardless, for sufficiently high m, (m, δ) is negligible and we can take Eq [êrrS (h)] ≈ err (h∗). So in
this regime the classification error is . err (h∗); it can be much lower due to the final term of (7), again
highlighting the benefit of voting behavior when there is ensemble disagreement.
Many Good Classifiers and Infinite H. The guarantees of this section are particularly nontrivial if there
is a significant (q-)fraction of hypotheses in H with low error. The uniform distribution over these good
hypotheses (call it ug) has support of a significant size, and therefore KL (ug || q0) is low, where q0 is a
uniform prior over H. (The same approach extends to infinite hypothesis classes.)
4.2 Discussion
Our approach to generating confidence-rated predictions has two distinct parts: the PAC-Bayes analysis and
then the minimax analysis. This explicitly decouples the selection of q from the aggregation of ensemble
predictions, and makes clear the sources of robustness here: PAC-Bayes works with any data distribution
and any posterior q, and the minimax scenario works with any q and yields worst-case guarantees. It also
means that either of the parts is substitutable.
The PAC-Bayes theorem itself admits improvements which would tighten the results achieved by our
approach. Two notable ones are the use of generic chaining to incorporate finer-grained complexity of H
[9], and an extension to the transductive online setting of sampling without replacement, in which no i.i.d.
generative assumption is required [10].
5 Extension to Abstention
This section outlines a natural extension of the previous binary classification game, in which the predictor
can choose to abstain from committing to a label and suffer a fixed loss instead. We model the impact of
abstaining by treating it as a third classification outcome with a relative cost of α > 0, where α is a constant
independent of the true labels. Concretely, consider the following general modification of our earlier game
with parameter α > 0:
1. Predictor: On an example i ∈ [n], the predictor can either predict a value in [−1, 1] or abstain
(denoted by an output of ⊥). When it does not abstain, it predicts gi ∈ [−1, 1] as in the previous
game. But it does so only with probability 1− pai for some pai ∈ [0, 1]; the rest of the time it abstains,
where Pr (output ⊥ on i) = 1− Pr (predict gi on i) = pai . So the predictor’s strategy in the game is a
choice of (g,pa), where g = (g1, . . . , gn)
> ∈ [−1, 1]n and pa = (pa1 , . . . , pan)> ∈ [0, 1]n.
2. Nature: Nature chooses z as before to represent its randomized label choices for the data.
3. Cost model: The predictor suffers cost (nature’s gain) of the form 1n
∑n
i=1 li(zˆi, zi), where zˆi ∈ {gi,⊥}
is the predictor’s output. The cost function li(·, ·) incorporates abstention using a constant loss α > 0
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if zˆi =⊥, regardless of zi:
li(zˆi, zi) =
{
1
2 (1− gizi) zˆi = gi
α zˆi =⊥
(8)
In this game (the “abstain game”), the predictor wishes to minimize the expected loss w.r.t. the stochastic
strategies of itself and nature, and nature plays to maximize this loss. So the game can be formulated as:
min
pa∈[0,1]n,
g∈[−1,1]n
max
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
pai α+
1
2
(1− pai ) (1− gizi)
]
=
1
2
+
1
n
(
min
pa∈[0,1]n
[
n∑
i=1
(
α− 1
2
)
pai
− 1
2
max
g∈[−1,1]n
min
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
n∑
i=1
zi (1− pai ) gi
])
(9)
5.1 Value of the Abstain Game
Minimax duality does apply to (9), and the dual game is easier to work with. Calculating its value leads to
the following result.
Theorem 5. The value Vabst of the game (9) is as follows for α <
1
2 .
1. If α ≤ 12
(
1− nλ∑n
i=1|ai|
)
, then Vabst = α (and the game is vacuous with the minimax optimal strategy
pa∗ = 1n).
2. If α > 12
(
1− nλ∑n
i=1|ai|
)
, then the value is nontrivial and can be bounded. Using Ordering 1 of the
examples, let w = min
i ∈ [n] : 1n
 i∑
j=1
|aj |+
n∑
j=i+1
(1− 2α) |aj |
 ≥ λ
. Then α (1− wn ) ≤ Vabst ≤
α
(
1− w−1n
)
.
The first part of this result implies that if there is a low abstain cost α > 0, a low enough average
correlation λ, and not many disagreements among the ensemble, then it is best to simply abstain a.s. on all
points. This is intuitively appealing, but it appears to be new to the literature.
Though the value Vabst is obtainable as above, we find solving for the optimal strategies in closed form to
be more challenging. As we are primarily interested in the learning problem and therefore tractable strategies
for the abstain game, we abandon the minimax optimal approach and present a simple near-optimal strategy
for the algorithm. This strategy has several favorable properties which facilitate comparison with the rest
of the paper and with prior work.
5.2 Near-Optimal Strategy for the Abstain Game
The following is our main result for the abstain game, derived in Section 5.4.
Theorem 6. Using Ordering 1 of the examples, define v as in Lemma 1. Let g∗ be the minimax optimal
strategy for the predictor in the binary classification game without abstentions, as described in Theorem 2.
Suppose the predictor in the abstain game (9) plays (g∗,pa,alg) respectively, where
pa,alg =
{
1− |g∗| α < 12
0 α ≥ 12
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1. The worst-case loss incurred by the predictor is at most
1
2
(
1− v
n
)
when α ≥ 12 , and α
(
1− vn
)
+(
1
2 − α
)
1
n
∑
i>v
|ai|
|av| when α <
1
2 .
2. Nature can play z∗ to induce this worst-case loss.
We remark that pa,alg is nearly minimax optimal in certain situations. Specifically, its worst-case loss
can be quite close to the ideal Vabst ≈ α
(
1− wn
)
, which is defined in Theorem 5. In fact, v ≥ w, so for
pa,alg to be nearly minimax optimal, it suffices if the term
(
1
2 − α
)
1
n
∑
i>v
|ai|
|av| is low. Loosely speaking,
this occurs when α ≈ 12 or there is much disagreement among the ensemble, or when λ (therefore v) is high.
The latter is typical when err (h∗) is low and the PAC-Bayes transduction algorithm is run; so in such
cases, the simple strategy pa,alg is almost minimax optimal. Such a low-error case has been analyzed before
in the abstaining setting, notably by [11], who extrapolate from the much deeper theoretical understanding
of the realizable case (when err (h∗) = 0).
We have argued that pa,alg achieves a worst-case loss arbitrarily close to Vabst in the limit λ → 1,
regardless of α. So we too are extrapolating somewhat from the realizable case with the approximately
optimal pa,alg, though in a different way from prior work.
Benefit of Abstention. Theorem 6 clearly illustrates the benefit of abstention when pa,alg is played. To see
this, define V as in (4) to be the value of the binary classification game without abstention. Then the worst-
case classification error of the minimax optimal rule without abstention is 12 (1− V ) ≤ 12
(
1− v−1n
)
:= Ln.
An upper bound on the worst-case loss incurred by the abstaining predictor that plays (g∗,pa,alg) is given
in Theorem 6, and can be rewritten as La :=
1
2
(
1− vn
) − 1n∑i>v ( 12 − α) (1− |ai||av|). Ln − La is positive
for α < 12 ,
5 illustrating the benefit of abstention. There is no benefit if α ≥ 12 , and increasing benefit the
further below 12 it gets. The α >
1
2 result is to be expected - even the trivial strategy of predicting g = 0 is
preferable to abstention if α > 12 - and echoes long-known results for this cost model in various settings [12].
Cost Model. The linear cost model we use, with one cost parameter α, is prevalent in the literature [13, 2],
as its simplicity allows for tractable optimality analyses in various scenarios [14, 12, 15, 16]. Many of these
results, however, assume that the conditional label probabilities are known or satisfy low-noise conditions
[14]. Others explicitly use the value of α [15], which is an obstacle to practical use because α is often
unknown or difficult to compute. Our near-optimal prediction rule sidesteps this problem, because the
strategy (g∗,pa,alg) is independent of α in the nontrivial case α < 12 . To our knowledge, this is unique in
the literature, and is a major motivation for our choice of pa,alg.
5.3 Guarantees for a Learning Algorithm with Abstentions
The near-optimal abstaining rule of Section 5.2 can be bootstrapped into a PAC-Bayes prediction algorithm
that can abstain, exactly analogous to Section 4 for the non-abstaining case. Similarly to that analysis,
PAC-style results can be stated for the abstaining algorithm for α < 12 (calculations in Appendix B), using
q,q0, (·, ·, ·, ·), S defined in Section 4, and any δ ∈ (0, 1). The algorithm:
abstains w.p.
≤ 2Eq [êrrS (h)] + 2(m,q,q0, δ) + δ − 1
n
∑
i>v
|ai|
|av|
and errs (6=⊥) w.p.
≤ Eq [êrrS (h)] + (m,q,q0, δ) + δ − 1
2n
v∑
i=1
(1− |ai|)
5As written here, Ln − La = 1n
∑
i>v
(
1
2
− α) (1− |ai||av|) − 12n , and the − 12n term can be dispensed with by lowering Ln
using a slightly more careful analysis.
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Thus, by the same arguments as in the discussion of Section 4.1, the abstain and mistake probabilities are
respectively . 2err (h∗) and . err (h∗) for sufficiently large m. Both are sharper than corresponding results
of Freund et al. [4], whose work is in a similar spirit.
Their setup is similar to our ensemble setting for abstention, and they choose q to be an exponential-
weights distribution over H. In their work [4], the decision to abstain on the ith example is a deterministic
function of |ai| only (ours is a stochastic function of the full vector a), and any non-⊥ predictions are made
deterministically with the majority vote (ours can be stochastic). Predicting stochastically and exploiting
transduction lead to our mistake probability being essentially optimal (Footnote 4) as opposed to the ≈
2err (h∗) of Freund et al. [4] caused by averaging effects. Our abstain probability also compares favorably
to the ≈ 5err (h∗) in [4].
5.4 Derivation of Theorem 6
Define another ordering of the examples here:
Ordering 5. Order the examples so that
|a1|
1− pa1
≥ |a2|
1− pa2
≥ · · · ≥ |an|
1− pan
. 6 
We motivate and analyze the near-optimal strategy by considering the primal abstain game (9). Note
that the inner max-min of (9) is very similar to the no-abstain case of Section 3. So we can solve it similarly
by taking advantage of minimax duality, just as previously in Lemma 1.
Lemma 7. Using Ordering 5 of the examples w.r.t. any fixed pa, define v2 = min
{
i ∈ [n] : 1n
∑i
j=1 |aj | ≥ λ
}
.
Then
max
g∈[−1,1]n
min
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi (1− pai ) gi
=
1
n
v2−1∑
i=1
(1− pai ) +
1− pav2
|av2 |
(
λ− 1
n
v2−1∑
i=1
|ai|
)
Substituting Lemma 7 into (9) still leaves a minimization over pa in (9). Solving this minimization would
then lead to the minimax optimal strategy (g∗,pa∗) for the predictor.
We are unable to solve this minimization in closed form, because the choice of pa and Ordering 5 depend
on each other. However, we prove a useful property of the optimal solution here.
Lemma 8. Suppose pa∗ is the minimax optimal predictor’s abstain strategy. Using Ordering 5 of the
examples w.r.t. pa∗, define v2 as in Lemma 7. If α ≥ 12 , then pa∗ = 0. If α < 12 , then for any i > v2, the
minimax optimal pa∗i must be set so that
|av2 |
1− pa∗v2
=
|ai|
1− pa∗i
The near-optimal abstain rule we choose has the properties outlined by Lemma 8, but uses Ordering 1
of the examples, as the results of Theorem 5 use this ordering.
A convenient consequence is that when pa,alg is played, Orderings 1 and 5 of the examples are effectively
the same.
6 Hereafter we make two assumptions for simplicity. One is that there are no examples such that pai = 1 exactly. The other
is to neglect the effect of ties and tiebreaking. These assumptions do not lose generality for our purposes, because coming
arbitrarily close to breaking them is acceptable.
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6 Conclusion
We have presented an analysis of aggregating an ensemble for binary classification, using minimax worst-
case techniques to formulate it as an game and suggest an optimal prediction strategy g∗, and PAC-Bayes
analysis to derive statistical learning guarantees.
The transductive setting, in which we consider predicting on many test examples at once, is key to our
analysis in this manuscript, as it enables us to formulate intuitively appealing and nontrivial strategies z∗,g∗
for the game without further assumptions, by studying how the ensemble errors are allocated among test
examples. We aim to explore such arguments further in future work.
10
References
[1] Ran El-Yaniv and Yair Wiener. On the foundations of noise-free selective classification. The Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 11:1605–1641, 2010.
[2] Marten Wegkamp and Ming Yuan. Support vector machines with a reject option. Bernoulli, 17(4):1368–
1385, 2011.
[3] Ilia Nouretdinov, Sergi G. Costafreda, Alexander Gammerman, Alexey Ya. Chervonenkis, Vladimir
Vovk, Vladimir Vapnik, and Cynthia H. Y. Fu. Machine learning classification with confidence: Applica-
tion of transductive conformal predictors to mri-based diagnostic and prognostic markers in depression.
NeuroImage, 56(2):809–813, 2011.
[4] Yoav Freund, Yishay Mansour, and Robert E Schapire. Generalization bounds for averaged classifiers.
Annals of Statistics, pages 1698–1722, 2004.
[5] Avrim Blum, John Lafferty, Mugizi Robert Rwebangira, and Rajashekar Reddy. Semi-supervised learn-
ing using randomized mincuts. In Proceedings of the twenty-first International Conference on Machine
Learning, page 13. ACM, 2004.
[6] Bianca Zadrozny and Charles Elkan. Transforming classifier scores into accurate multiclass probability
estimates. In Proceedings of the eighth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery
and data mining, pages 694–699. ACM, 2002.
[7] Glenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk. A tutorial on conformal prediction. The Journal of Machine Learning
Research, 9:371–421, 2008.
[8] John Langford. Tutorial on practical prediction theory for classification. Journal of Machine Learning
Research, 6:273–306, 2005.
[9] Jean-Yves Audibert and Olivier Bousquet. Combining pac-bayesian and generic chaining bounds. The
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 8:863–889, 2007.
[10] Luc Be`gin, Pascal Germain, Franc¸ois Laviolette, and Jean-Francis Roy. Pac-bayesian theory for trans-
ductive learning. In Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS), 2014.
[11] Ran El-Yaniv and Yair Wiener. Agnostic selective classification. In Neural Information Processing
Systems (NIPS), 2011.
[12] C K Chow. An optimum character recognition system using decision functions. Electronic Computers,
IRE Transactions on, (4):247–254, 1957.
[13] Francesco Tortorella. An optimal reject rule for binary classifiers. In Advances in Pattern Recognition,
pages 611–620. Springer, 2000.
[14] Peter L Bartlett and Marten H Wegkamp. Classification with a reject option using a hinge loss. The
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 9:1823–1840, 2008.
[15] C K Chow. On optimum recognition error and reject tradeoff. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions
on, 16(1):41–46, 1970.
[16] Ming Yuan and Marten Wegkamp. Classification methods with reject option based on convex risk
minimization. The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 11:111–130, 2010.
[17] Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi and Ga`bor Lugosi. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge University Press,
New York, NY, USA, 2006.
11
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. It suffices to find the value of the dual game (3). Consider the inner optimization problem
faced by the predictor in this game (where z is fixed and known to it):
Find: max
g
1
n
z>g Such that: − 1n ≤ g ≤ 1n (10)
The contribution of the ith example to the payoff of (10) is 1ngizi; to maximize this within the constraint−1 ≤ gi ≤ 1, it is clear that the predictor will set gi = sgn(zi). The predictor therefore plays g˜ = sgn(z),
where sgn(·) is taken componentwise.
With this g˜, the game (for the average performance constraint) reduces to
Find: min
z
1
n
z>g˜ = min
z
1
n
n∑
i=1
|zi|
Such that: 1nz
>a ≥ λ and − 1n ≤ z ≤ 1n (11)
For any i ∈ [n], changing the value of zi from 0 to  raises the payoff by 1n ||, and can raise 1nz>a by at most
1
n |ai|. Thus, the data examples which allow nature to progress most towards satisfying the performance
constraint are those with the highest |ai|, for which nature should set zi = ±1 to extract every advantage
(avoid leaving slack in the hypercube constraint). This argument holds inductively for the first v−1 examples
before the constraint 1nz
>a ≥ λ is satisfied; the vth example can have |zi| < 1 from boundary effects, and
for i > v, nature would set zi = 0 to minimize the payoff. (All this can also be shown by checking the KKT
conditions.)
Consequently, the z that solves (11) can be defined by a sequential greedy procedure:
1. Initialize z = 0, “working set” of examples S = ∅.
2. Select an i ∈ arg max
j∈[n]\S
|aj | and set S = S ∪ {i}.
3. If
∑
j∈S
1
n |aj | < λ: set zi = sgn(ai) and go back to step 2.
4. Else: set zi = sgn(ai)− 1ai
(∑
j∈S |aj | − nλ
)
and terminate, returning z.
Call the vector set by this procedure z˜. Then under the constraints of (3), min
z
max
g
1
n
z>g = max
g
1
n
z˜>g =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|z˜i| = v − 1
n
+
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣sgn(av)− 1av
(
v∑
i=1
|ai| − nλ
)∣∣∣∣∣ = v − 1n + 1|av|
(
λ−
v−1∑
i=1
1
n
|ai|
)
= V , as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We have already considered the dual game in Lemma 1, from which it is clear that if
z∗ is played, then regardless of g, 1nz
∗>g ≤ v−1n + 1|av|
(
λ− 1n
∑v−1
i=1 |ai|
)
= V , and therefore z∗ is minimax
optimal.
Now it suffices to prove that the predictor can force a correlation of ≥ V by playing g∗ in the primal
game, where it plays first. After g∗ is played, nature is faced with the following problem:
Find: min
z
1
n
z>g∗ (12)
Such that: 1nz
>a ≥ λ and − 1n ≤ z ≤ 1n
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Now since 1nz
>a ≥ λ, we have the inequality
1
n
z>g∗ =
1
n
v∑
i=1
sgn(ai)zi +
1
n |av|
n∑
i=v+1
aizi
≥ 1
n
v∑
i=1
sgn(ai)zi +
1
|av|
(
λ− 1
n
v∑
i=1
aizi
)
=
1
n
v−1∑
i=1
sgn(ai)zi
(
1− |ai||av|
)
+
λ
|av| (13)
For i ∈ [1, v − 1], 1 − |ai||av| ≤ 0. So to minimize (13) (and solve (12)), nature sets zi so that sgn(ai)zi
is maximized. For each i ≤ v − 1, nature can force sgn(ai)zi = 1 by setting zi = sgn(ai), and this is the
maximum possible: sgn(ai)zi ≤ |zi| ≤ 1.
From (13), we see that the values {zi}i≥v are irrelevant to the payoff, so any setting of z that sets
zi = sgn(ai) for i ≤ v − 1 (call such a setting z˜) will solve (12).
min
z
1
n
z>g∗ =
1
n
z˜>g∗ =
1
n
v−1∑
i=1
(
1− |ai||av|
)
+
λ
|av| = V
so we have argued that g∗ forces a correlation of ≥ V , and therefore it is minimax optimal. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Note that the abstain game (9) is linear in all three vectors g,pa, z. All three constraint
sets are convex and compact, as well, so the minimax theorem can be invoked (see Prop. 9), yielding
Vabst = min
pa∈[0,1]n
min
g∈[−1,1]n
max
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
pai α+
1
2
(1− pai ) (1− gizi)
]
= max
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
min
pa∈[0,1]n
min
g∈[−1,1]n
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
pai α+
1
2
(1− pai ) (1− gizi)
]
= max
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
min
pa∈[0,1]n
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
pai α+
1
2
(1− pai ) (1− |zi|)
]
= max
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
(
α,
1
2
(1− |zi|)
)
(14)
From this point, the analysis is a variation on the proof of Lemma 1 from (11) onwards.
Consider nature’s strategy when faced with (14). A trivial upper bound on (14) is α regardless of z, and
for any i it is possible to set zi such that |zi| ≤ 1 − 2α without lowering (14) from α. So nature can first
set z = (1− 2α) sgn(a), to progress most towards satisfying the 1nz>a ≥ λ constraint while maintaining the
value at α.
If z = (1−2α) sgn(a) meets the constraint 1nz>a ≥ λ, i.e. 1−2αn
∑n
i=1 |ai| ≥ λ =⇒ α ≤ 12
(
1− nλ∑n
i=1|ai|
)
,
then the value is clearly α.
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Otherwise, i.e. if c := λ− 1−2αn
∑n
i=1 |ai| > 0, then nature must start with the setting z′ := (1−2α) sgn(a)
and continue raising |zi| for some indices i until the constraint 1nz>a ≥ λ is met. c can be thought of as a
budget that nature must satisfy by starting from z′ and adjusting {z′i}i∈S away from 0 for some subset S of
the indices [n].
For any i, raising |z′i| in this way by some small  raises nature’s payoff by 2 , and lowers the remaining
budget by  |ai|. Therefore, to satisfy the budget with maximum payoff, the examples get |zi| set to 1 in
descending order of |ai| (Ordering 1, which we therefore use for the rest of this proof) until the remaining
budget to satisfy runs out.
This occurs on the wth example (using Ordering 1), where w = min
{
i ∈ [n] : 2αn
∑i
j=1 |aj | ≥ c
}
, which
after a little algebra is equivalent to the statement of the theorem.
Substituting this into (14), we get
Vabst =
1
n
(
w−1∑
i=1
min (α, 0) +
1
2
(1− |zw|) +
n∑
i=w+1
α
)
= α
(
1− w
n
)
+
1
2n |aw|
cn− 2αw−1∑
j=1
|aj |
 (15)
Now by definition of w, 2αn
∑w−1
j=1 |aj | ≤ c ≤ 2αn
∑w
j=1 |aj |. Using this to bound (15) gives the result. 
Proof of Lemma 7. Just as with the non-abstaining game in Lemma 1, it is clear that minimax duality
applies to this game. Therefore, we can find the value of the dual game instead, which is done directly using
the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1.
max
g∈[−1,1]n
min
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi (1− pai ) gi
= min
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
max
g∈[−1,1]n
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi (1− pai ) gi
= min
z∈[−1,1]n,
1
nz
>a≥λ
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1− pai ) |zi|
=
1
n
v2−1∑
i=1
(1− pai ) +
1− pav2
|av2 |
(
λ− 1
n
v2−1∑
i=1
|ai|
)

Proof of Lemma 8. Define v2 as in Lemma 7; throughout this proof, we use Ordering 5 of the examples.
Substituting Lemma 7 into (9), the value of the game is
Vabst =
1
2
+
1
n
min
pa∈[0,1]n
[
v2∑
i=1
(
αpai −
1
2
)
+
n∑
i=v2+1
(
α− 1
2
)
pai
]
(16)
It only remains to (approximately) solve the minimization in (16), keeping in mind that v2 depends on
pai because of the ordering of the coordinates (Ordering 5).
If α ≥ 12 , then regardless of i, neither sum of (16) can increase with increasing pai . In this case, the
minimizer pa∗ = 0, identically zero for all examples.
14
If α < 12 , consider an example z := xi for some i > v2. We prove that
|av2 |
1−pa∗v2
= |ai|1−pa∗i . If this is not true,
i.e.
|av2 |
1−pa∗v2
> |ai|1−pa∗i , then p
a∗
i can be raised while keeping z out of the top v2 examples. This would decrease
the second sum of (16) because α− 12 < 0, which contradicts the assumption that pa∗i is optimal. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Under the optimal strategy pa∗, Orderings 1 and 5 are identical for our purposes, so
v2 = v. Revisiting the argument of Lemma 7 with this information, the predictor’s and Nature’s strategies
g∗ and z∗ are identical to their minimax optimal strategies in the non-abstaining case. Substituting pa,alg
into (16) gives the worst-case loss after simplification. 
B PAC-Style Results for the Abstain Game
This appendix contains the calculations used to prove the results of Section 5.3.
If the algorithm abstains at all (α < 12 ), the overall probability that it does so is
1
n
n∑
i=1
pa,algi =
1
n
∑
i>v
(
1− |ai||av|
)
≤ 1− 1
n
∑
i≤v
|ai| − 1
n
∑
i>v
|ai|
|av|
≤ 1− λ− 1
n
∑
i>v
|ai|
|av|
Using a union bound with (6) gives the result on the abstain probability.
When α < 12 , the probability that the predictor predicts an incorrect label ( 6=⊥) under minimax optimal
play depends on nature’s play z. It can be calculated as (w.p. ≥ 1− δ):
1
2n
n∑
i=1
(1− pa∗i ) (1− g∗i zi) (17)
=
1
2n
v∑
i=1
(1− sgn(ai)zi) + 1
2n
∑
i>v
|ai|
|av|
(
1− ai|av|zi
)
=
1
2n
[
n∑
i=1
min
(
1,
|ai|
|av|
)
−
∑
i≤v
zi sgn(ai)−
∑
i>v
zi sgn(ai)
a2i
a2v
]
:= pinc(z) (18)
Under the constraints −1n ≤ z ≤ 1n and 1nz>a ≥ λ, the maximizer of (17) w.r.t. z is indeed z∗, so the
chance of predicting incorrectly is
pinc(z) ≤ pinc(z∗) = 1
2n
 n∑
i=1
min
(
1,
|ai|
|av|
)
−
∑
i≤v
1

≤ n− v
2n
=
1
2
(
1− v
n
)
≤ 1
2
(1− λ)− 1
2n
v∑
i=1
(1− |ai|)
Using a union bound with (6) gives the result on the probability of an incorrect non-abstention.
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C Application of the Minimax Theorem
Proposition 9. Let R = {v ∈ Rn : −1n ≤ v ≤ 1n} and A = {z ∈ Rn : 1nz>a ≥ λ}. Then
max
g∈R
min
z∈R∩A
1
n
z>g = min
z∈R∩A
max
g∈R
1
n
z>g
Proof. Both R and A are convex and compact, as is R ∩ A. The payoff function 1nz>g is linear in z and g.
Therefore the minimax theorem (e.g. [17], Theorem 7.1) applies, giving the result. 
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